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Gender diversity on Boards and Forward-looking Information Disclosure: 
Evidence from Jordan 
1. Introduction 
 
Academic and Policy interest in greater diversity in the boardrooms is rapidly increasing and 
has become a major debate in the corporate governance literature. For example,  a number of 
studies have analyzed the impact of women in corporate boards on different aspects of the 
management such as decision-making, risk taking, general firm performance and value of the 
firm. Nevertheless, little direct evidence exists on the relation between gender diversity on 
the board of directors and voluntary disclosures (Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Adams et al., 
2009; Arun et al., 2015). This paper contributes to this debate by examining the issue of 
gender diversity in corporate boards. A substantial amount of research, suggests that firms 
with a high percentage of female members on the board and at top management level perform 
better than those without (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera, 2008; Adams et al., 2009). The evidence suggests that female representation on the 
board might add unique viewpoints to the boardrooms, work styles, and different experiences 
as compared to their male counterparts which is likely to improve the creativity and quality of 
the board decisions (Daily et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2006). Further to this, the literature 
suggests that female directors improve firm disclosure through better monitoring (Gul et al., 
2011b).  However, the research on the impact of female directors on voluntary forward-
looking Information Disclosure (FLID) statements is sparse. We were motivated by this gap 
and the evidence which reveals that financial reporting practices vary with the individual 
characteristics of directors (Dikolli et al., 2012; Schrand and Zechman, 2012; Davidson et al., 
2013). In particular, we examine the role played by female directors on  FLI statements, using 
the narrative disclosures from the annual financial reports of non-financial Jordanian 
companies listed on the Amman stock exchange (ASE).  
     This study is conducted in Jordan, a developing country situated in the Western region of 
Asia, which has an open economy. Its economic philosophy is based on the adoption of a 
market economy and liberalization of trade, which makes it capable of adopting its own local 
laws in line with those of its international counterparts (Aljifri and Khasharmeh, 2006). ASE, 
the biggest stock market in the region, works in close collaboration with the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC) on surveillance matters and has a strong relationship with other 
exchanges, associations and international organizations. The Jordanian capital market is 
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mature by regional standards and integrates with Middle East market, which implies little 
long-run risk diversification (Saadi-Sedik and Petri, 2006). Previous studies found that 
managers in family companies are more likely to disclose more FLID than those managing 
non-family companies (Ali et al. 2007; Chau and Gray 2010). The Jordanian capital market 
consists of a relatively large fraction of family-controlled companies, there were 128 (64 
percent) family companies and 73 (36 percent) non-family companies listed on the ASE over 
the period 2008-2013 (ASE, 2015). Thus, this setting in Jordan provides an opportunity for 
managers to disclose more information. We assumed that the issue of gender diversity on 
boards in family/non family companies is worth investigating. Since 2007, the ASE has 
insisted that, all listed companies required to increase the credibility and transparency of 
financial reporting by adopting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and 
the listed companies enhanced their voluntary disclosure since then. Furthermore, the 
Government of Jordan has introduced numerous reforms through accounting regulations, 
securities exchange laws and corporate disclosure practices. These reforms contribute to more 
transparent markets and the listed companies have enhanced their voluntary disclosure (Al-
Fayoumi et al., 2010; Al-Akra and Ali, 2012; JSC, 2015).  
     The Jordanian capital market began to be transformed from a public to a private market. 
Moreover, the practice of corporate governance in Jordan began in 2008 and the corporate 
governance code number 15 requires that the fraction of female on the board of directors 
should be increased among all listed companies (Abed et al. 2012). Sartawi et al. (2014) 
found that the percentage of female directors of Jordanian companies is 5%. Jordan, 
therefore, provides a unique national context in which to investigate the link between the 
narrative disclosure of FLI and gender diversity on boards among non-financial companies 
listed on the ASE during the period 2008 - 2013. The current study argues that non-financial 
Jordanian companies with a high percentage of female members on the board and at top 
management level are more likely to disclose more FLI. There are very limited number of 
studies that have examined the disclosure of FLI in developing countries and even fewer such 
studies may be found in Middle Eastern countries.  
This study provides one the very first evidence on  the impact of gender diversity on the 
board on the level of FLID, in a developing country context. Our results reveal that FLID by 
companies are positively associated with gender diversity on board. Since gender diversity of 
boards and voluntary reporting are two most debated issues in the corporate World, this study 
provides evidence that gender diversity on board is one of the attributes influencing the 
voluntary FLID. In addition, our results reveal that companies with CEO females are more 
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likely to disclose more FLID. Furthermore, we use a unique setting, family versus non-family 
firms, to further examine the effect of ownership structure, specifically family ownership, on 
voluntary disclosure. Prior studies reveal that voluntary disclosure leads to lower bid-ask 
spreads, lower information risk, and lower cost of raising capital (Welker, 1995; Botosan, 
1997; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The results suggest that family companies, who stand to 
gain greater benefits, would prefer more public disclosure, and shows a significant positive 
relationship. The findings are useful for the policy community who are concerned with the 
impact of governance structure on corporate disclosure.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review and 
section 3 presents our research design. The main results are discussed in section 4, and we 
provide a summary of our results and conclusion in section 5.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.2. Gender diversity on the board and voluntary disclosure  
There is a widely held assumption prevailed in the academic and policy circles that the 
gender structuring of the corporate boards will bring alternate views and transparency in the 
corporate decision making process. The prior literature documented the difference between 
male and female in terms of personality, communication style, decision-making, risk taking, 
leadership, expertise and general performance in business (e.g. Johnson and Powell, 1994; 
Bilimoria, 2000; Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Dowling and Aribi, 2013) which implies that 
women present an alternative perspective which requires attention in all areas of corporate 
governance. The extent to which the difference between females and males might apply to 
the decisions on corporate reporting which has largely been resolved as an empirical 
question. Coffey and Wang (1998) found that women directors are less self-interest oriented 
which improve decision making process and enhance board effectiveness. Post et al. (2011) 
argue that gender diversity on the board of directors improve the chances that different types 
of knowledge, ideas, and perspectives will be considered in the decision-making process. 
Women brings different viewpoints to the boardroom which facilitate informed decisions 
(Daily et al., 2000; Rose, 2007) with an increasing transparency in decision making. 
Politically, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find that having more women on boards enhances 
reputation, and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) found a positive market reaction in the 
short term to the announcement of female board appointments.  
     The disclosure of FLI may be viewed as a key aspect of financial reporting quality since 
this information is more likely to be perceived as being of higher quality (Karamanou and 
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Vafeas, 2005; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Since FLID capture current plans and future forecasts 
(Hussainey et al., 2003), the lack of sufficient FLID may end up with volatile stock prices 
and uncertainty in investments. The “traditional” reporting, largely based on financial 
statements has been questioned in terms of its ability to meet the increasing information 
needs (Michelon et al., 2015). It is quite challenging for many users understand the elements 
of financial statements without narrative explanations due to the increasing complexity of 
regulations, business contexts, firm’s strategies and operations makes. In fact, narrative 
disclosures contribute not only through the clarification of quantitative and financial 
measures but also through the identification of value-generation drivers not represented well 
in the financial statements (e.g. Schleicher et al., 2007; Souabni, 2011; Michelon et al., 2015). 
     Gender diversity on board improves disclosure quality through better control of the 
managers that increase the transparency and promotes active board communication to 
investors. For example, Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that gender diversity on boards is positively 
related to audit effort and earnings quality. They find that female directors on the board and 
audit committees enhances the company’s reporting integrity and investors’ confidence in 
financial reporting. However, in contrast to these findings, Sun et al. (2011) found no 
evidence for the impact of female representation on audit committees and earnings 
management.  Liao et al. (2014) provide evidence that gender diversity on the board is 
positively associated with financial and nonfinancial information disclosure. Suggesting that, 
companies with a higher proportion of gender diversity of the board are more likely to 
disclose more FLID, the findings of  Gibbins et al. (1990); Nalikka (2009) and Sartawi et al. 
(2014)  provided further evidence that gender diversity is one of the attributes influencing 
positively the voluntary information disclosures in annual reports. In the same vein, Barako 
and Brown (2008) reported that a higher level of female representation and independent 
directors significantly enhance corporate disclosure. A recent study by Thankom et al. (2015) 
examines the relationship between female director and earnings management in the UK. They 
found firms with a higher number of female and independent female directors are adopting 
restrained earnings management and tend to adopt more conservative accounting policies 
compared with those companies with a lower number of female and directors. 
Building on the above discussion, we propose our first hypothesis as: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female on the board of 
directors and the level of  FLID.  
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2.3. CEO’s gender and voluntary disclosure 
Previous studies suggest that the gender of company executives has an influence on corporate 
decisions and that female executives tend to take a different perspective and demand different 
information than their male counterparts (Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Sun et al., 2011; 
Srinidhi et al., 2011). However, the extent to which gender influences corporate reporting 
decision-making remains unclear. For example, Ge et al. (2011) found no significant 
relationship between CFOs’ gender and accounting choices, while Krishnan and Parsons 
(2008) found that gender diversity in senior management affects the quality of reported 
earnings. Similarly, Gul et al. (2011a) examined whether the gender of directors affects fully 
independent audit committees’ ability to constrain earnings management and thus their 
effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting, finding that the proportion of females on 
the audit committee is not associated with earnings management. Jia et al. (2014) investigated 
the relationship between the facial structure of CEOs and their companies’ financial 
misreporting, and the results showed that companies with CEOs who have more masculine 
faces have a higher incidence of financial misreporting. Recent studies by Ho et al. (2015) 
and Thankom et al. (2015) found that female directors tend to adopt more restrained earnings 
management, reflecting an inclination towards more conservative accounting policies, and a 
more conservative mind-set among female CEOs characterised by a tendency to be less 
aggressive.  
H2. The level of FLID is positively associated with female CEOs among non-financial 
Jordanian companies. 
3. Research design 
3.1. Measuring the level of FLI disclosures: 
Content analysis was utilized to gather and explore the items of FLID in our sample, as 
extensively reported in the literature as a powerful tool to explore corporate disclosures ( e.g. 
Cunningham and Gadenne 2003; Mathuva 2012; Menicucci 2013). In addition, the disclosure 
index approach has bees used to measure the level of FLID (Maali et al. 2006). The decision 
to focus on the level of disclosures is often employed as a proxy for disclosure quality 
(Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). The level of FLID may be viewed as a key 
aspect of financial reporting quality since this information is more likely to be perceived as 
being of higher quality (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). This is useful 
in identifying specified characteristics of messages in a systematic manner (Carney (1972, p. 
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p.21) which allows codifying textual content into different categories depending on selected 
criteria (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). We treat the FLID items in the paper, using a list of 35 
forward-looking keywords such as anticipate, accelerate, coming year (Hussainey et al. 
2003). The disclosure index includes five categories, and twenty-seven items (See Appendix 
1).  
     We have employed  three steps to make sure the reliability and validity of the content 
analysis process: (1) Developed a set of specified and explicit coding instruments to 
minimize discrepancies, and ensure objectivity (2) Five annual reports have been tested by 
several coders to ensure that, all coders adopt the same coding procedures, to resolve the 
differences between the codes (3) the coding rules for classification of categories and 
checklist items are re-confirmed by five different professional accountants and the results 
were compared to identify possible disagreements. Our approach to score FLID items is 
dichotomous in that a FLID item scores value of one if disclosed otherwise zero, and the 
approach to scoring is detective and equally weighed. To measure the extent of FLID, we 
expressed the scores in the form of an index, which we called FLID index (e.g. Cerf, 1961; 
Rizk et al., 2008). The disclosure index was constructed as a ratio obtained by dividing the 
number of FLID items disclosed by the total number of FLID items for each company (e.g. 
Cerf, 1961; Rizk et al., 2008; Muttakin et al., 2015). 
This study used the following disclosure index to measure the level of FLID: 
  
FWD =                                                            
Where FWD refers to the forward-looking category disclosed and  = one if the category 
contains forward-looking items and zero if not.  
The FLI disclosures index for each company is set as FWD/TDS   
Where  
TDS is the maximum disclosure provided by the companies in their published annual 
financial reports.  
 
3.2. Empirical models 
We measured gender diversity on the board of directors in two ways. First, as a percentage of 
female directors computed by divided female numbers on the board on the total number of 
the board (POFOB). Second, the number of female directors on the board of directors 
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(NOFOB) (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Gul et al., 2011b). CEO’s gender is a dummy 
variable where the value 1 given if the CEO female and zero otherwise. We control for 
company-specific characteristics that may affect the level of FLID. These control variables 
are Company size, profitability, dividends, leverage and industry type. Prior studies 
suggested that,  these company-specific characteristics may affect the level of FLID (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Wallace et al., 1994; Beattie et al., 2004; Marston and Polei, 2004; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Celik et al., 2006; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Uyar and 
Kilic, 2012; Alkhatib, 2014). Since agency cost depends on the firm’s size, the agency theory 
assumes that larger companies perform a greater number of complex business transactions 
and are more likely to publish voluntary disclosures to decrease the costs (Pérez, 2004). 
Several studies have found a positive relationship between company size and the level of 
voluntary disclosures (Barako et al., 2006; Salama et al., 2012; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014; 
Jizi et al., 2014; Qu et al., 2015). In respect to firm profitability, Alkhatib and Marji (2012) 
and Uyar and Kilic (2012) found that companies with high profits are motivated to disclose 
more information than those with small profits. With respect to dividends and FLID, this 
study considers dividend policy as one of its key drivers. Recently, the relationship between 
the level of FLID and the firm’s dividend policy has gained considerable attention. For 
example, Hussainey and Walker (2009) argued that FLID and dividend payments are 
alternative methods to convey important information to investors. In respect to the 
relationship between the financial leverage ratio and the level of FLID,  agency theory claims 
that  highly leveraged firms have a greater contractual obligation to fulfil the information 
requests of long-term and short-term lenders, and therefore may offer more details to meet 
those needs than would a less leveraged company (Watson et al., 2002; García‐Meca and 
Sánchez‐Ballesta, 2009). The literature has reported that leverage ratio has an effect on the 
level of FLI disclosures (Deshmukh, 2005; Li and Zhao, 2008; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; 
Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Basiddiq and Hussainey, 2012; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014). 
Sector type is another determinant of company information disclosure (Celik et al., 2006, 
Alkhatib and Marji, 2012), where mixed results were found.  
  
FLIDit = β0 + β1 POFOB it + β2 CGENDit + β3 FSIZEit + β4 FPROFit + β5 FDIVID it + β6 
FLEVERit + β7 FISINit +ɛI                                                                                                      (1) 
FLIDit = β0 + β1 NOFOB it + β2 CGENDit + β3 FSIZEit + β4 FPROFit + β5 FDIVID it + β6 
FLEVERit + β7 FISINit +ɛI                                                                                                           (2) 
Where: 
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FLIDit= Forward-looking disclosure index of the I company in the t year, expressed as 
percentage total FLI disclosed out of all items.  
POFOB= the proportion of females on the board of director measured by dividing the number 
of females on board by total numbers of the board.  
NOFOB= the numbers of female on the board of director.  
CGEND= CEO’s gender, take the value one if CEO, male and 0 if CEO female.  
FSIZE= Firm size, natural log of firm’s total assets.  
FPROF= profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). 
FDIVID= dividend ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same 
period.  
FLEVER= leverage ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets.  
FISIN = industry type, measured by using the isin code as stated by the Jordanian Securities 
Depository Centre. 
 β0  The regression intercept. 
β1…………. β7 The regression coefficients. 
ɛ  The error term. 
3.3. Sample selection and data collection:  
The sample covers the period 2008-2013. In 2008, the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) has 
introduced new reforms for accounting regulations; securities exchange laws, and corporate 
disclosure practices, which contribute to more voluntary disclosure and transparent markets 
(Al-Akra and Ali 2012). Our initial sample for the study is the 270 companies listed on the 
ASE. However, we have removed all financial companies (42 companies) from the initial 
sample due to their unique characteristics and specific regulations and disclosing 
requirements which may have an impact on the results. In addition, companies with missing 
data been removed from the initial sample. The final sample consists of 1206 firm-years 
observations during the study period. Table 2 displays the final sample sorted by industry. 
     Data were collected from the annual reports published in the years 2008-2013. The data of 
directors’ gender is collected through different sources - annual reports, company web page, 
press releases, and direct communication with companies. Most of the annual reports are 
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available on the websites of the companies on a yearly basis. Botosan (1997) demonstrated 
that the annual reports provide a good proxy and comprehensive resource for the information 
disclosed by a firm. Most companies release their annual reports within the first quarter of the 
year, after the fiscal year. The annual reports are considered as a primary source of voluntary 
disclosure to the user group (e.g. Neu et al., 1998). Annual reports are considered more 
readily comparable among companies than other less formal communication channels, such 
as press releases, or direct contact analysts (Chang and Most, 1985). Furthermore, to cover 
some missing financial information in the annual reports, web sites of the Securities 
Depository Centre, Amman Stock Exchange, and OSIRIS databases were used as additional 
sources. Table 1 reports the sample based on industry type. 
 
Insert Table 1 about original distribution of the sample about industry 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive findings are summarized in Table 2. For our sample, the minimum value of 
the FLI disclosures rate is 0%, and the maximum is 78%. The findings indicate a 
considerable dispersion in the rates of FLI disclosures which reveals the variation occurs in 
Jordanian companies in term of their decision to change FLID from year to year.  The mean 
value 31.14% shows that a low level of FLID across the companies, with a standard deviation 
equal 18.44%. This study employed the median value 33% as a benchmark to classify the 
high and low level of FLID.  
     In terms of the proportion of females on the board, the mean value is 4.39%, and the 
lowest and highest percentage female on the board is 0 and 60% respectively. This finding is 
expected since the majority of Jordanian companies are owned by families. As in this study, 
Sartawi et al. (2014) found that the percentage of female directors of Jordanian companies is 
5%. The study has used a number of females on the board as a second proxy to measure 
gender diversity. Table 2 shows that the mean value of the number of female on the board is 
24.70% with standard deviation value 43.15% and minimum, and maximum values are 0 and 
6 respectively. This result is consistent with the prior study of Gavious et al. (2012) who find 
that the average number of women directors among Israel firms is one, and the maximum is 
5. Regarding CEO gender, Table 2 shows that 95.19% of the sample companies managed by 
male CEO. In our sample, 95% of companies managed by males and 5% of female CEOs.    
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This is an interesting finding, similar to the 5% obtained in Ireland, New Zealand and the 
United Arab Emirates (Grant Thornton International Business Report 2012), and quite close 
to the percentages for the USA and UK (6% females in both countries), but higher than the 
3% in Japan, Brazil and Botswana. Company’s size determined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets has a mean of (1801419) the minimum value of company size is (412636) and the 
maximum value is (28802374). Values of Company’s size indicate that companies are widely 
dispersed. The results of the profitability reveal that profitability varies between minimum 
values -85.90% (Loss) and 95% (Maximum profit). In addition, Table 2 shows that the mean 
value of dividend ratio is 18.82%, and, minimum and maximum values are 0 and 97.51%, 
respectively. It is also seen that the average value of the leverage ratio is 29.50%, and the 
minimum and maximum values are 0.002% and 97.80%. The mean value of industry type 
indicates that 36.31% of sample companies operating in the industrial sectors. 
Insert Table 2 about descriptive statistics 
 
 
Before conducting the regression analysis, we tested whether there was an econometric 
problem in the model used to examine the impact of gender diversity on boards on the level 
of FLID. As a first step, the multicollinearity problem was tested by using correlation 
matrices. Table 3 shows that the highest correlation is between the dividend ratio and the 
firm’s profitability with a coefficient of 37%. According to Gujarati (2008), a coefficient of ± 
80 per cent is considered as the point at which serious multicollinearity problems might exist 
and harm the results of the regression analysis.  Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity 
does not exist among the data set used in this model. 
 
Insert Table 3 about correlation matrix 
 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
The panel data allow us to remove any unobservable heterogeneity problem that might be 
existent among the companies in our sample. Panel data models can be specified as fixed 
effect or random effect to capture the impact of companies and specific time heterogeneities. 
We performed Housman test, which examines the equality of the fixed and random effect 
estimations. The test statistic outcome is not statistically significant (P-Value = 0.3107), and 
consequently we estimate random effect models. Pesaran CD test has been employed to 
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check whether the model has serial correlation or not, and the test result is not statistically 
significant (P-Value = 0.4237). Modifier’s Wald test outcome (P-Value = 0.5928) indicated 
that no heteroscedasticity in our model.  
     The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 4. The estimates are presented on 
two panels: Panel A) reports the results for the regressions where the gender diversity on the 
board of directors is measured by using percentage. While, the gender diversity on the board 
of directors in panel B) is measured based on the numbers of female on the board of directors. 
As can be seen from Table 4, the R2 values are varying between 55.6% and 54.7%, 
respectively, which mean the combination of the independent variables demonstrates 55.6%, 
54.7% of the variation of the dependent variable respectively. The P-Values are highly 
significant at the level 0.000, implying that the models are highly significant and thus have a 
good explanatory power of disclosure.  
     Results of both panels show a significant positive relationship between the gender 
diversity on the board of directors and the level of FLID, and support H1. This finding is 
consistent with studies that reported a significant positive association between percentage of 
female on the board of directors and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Nalikka, 2009; Sartawi et al., 
2014). The results of this study indicate that if more women directors are on the board, the 
more information is voluntarily disclosed by the company. The significant positive 
coefficient at level 0.016 of female CEOs suggests that companies with high CEO’s female 
are more likely to disclose more FLID than those companies with low CEO’s female. This 
finding supports H2, which proposes a positive relationship between the level of FLID and 
female CEOs, In addition, these findings confirm that Jordanian companies with high female 
CEOs are more likely to improve the quality of their financial reports by extending the level 
of FLI disclosures. This finding is not surprising since the Jordanian economy is private 
sector oriented; the owner-largest shareholder in Jordan, typically a founder or his immediate 
family usually involve in company management directly or indirectly and effects most of the 
manager’s decisions. This result is consistent with prior studies (Siciliano, 1996; Erhardt et 
al., 2003). In regard to the control variables, the regression results indicate that profitability, 
dividend ratio, and the leverage ratio variables are found to have a positive influence on the 
level of FLID in both panels. For example,  the findings of the study show that companies 
with high profits are motivated to disclose more information than those with small profits. 
Furthermore, these results confirm that Jordanian companies with higher dividend ratio tend 
to use FLLD and dividend payments, as alternative methods to convey important information 
to investors. In respect to the relationship between the financial leverage ratio and the level of 
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FLID, the findings are consistent with agency theory’s perspective; that  highly leveraged 
firms have a greater contractual obligation to fulfil the information requests of long-term and 
short-term lenders, and may offer more details to meet those needs than a less leveraged 
company (Watson et al., 2002; García‐Meca and Sánchez‐Ballesta, 2009).  The results are 
consistent with prior studies which suggest that, companies with higher profitability, 
dividend, and leverage ratio are more likely to disclose additional voluntary information to 
increase their investor’s confidence (Alkhatib and Marji, 2012; Uyar and Kilic, 2012). The 
results of the study are also consistent with Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) and Aljifri (2008) 
who reported that firms of varying sizes have no difference in their FLID.  
 
 
Insert Table 4 about the association between percentages of female on the board of 
directors, female CEOs and FLID. 
 
 
4.3. Further analysis 
 
We test the level of agency problem among family and non-family companies in the context 
of their voluntary disclosure practices. The existing evidence indicate that family companies 
face fewer agency problems because of their ability to monitor the managers (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985), which may have an impact on disclosure practices. We divided the sample into 
two groups, family companies and non-family firms, using Jordanian Companies Control 
Department Classification (2014). There are 128 (64%) family companies and 73 (36%) non-
family companies were listed on the ASE over the period 2008-2013.  
     There are two contradictory theoretical perspectives regarding the relationship between 
family companies and voluntary disclosure - convergence of interest and the management 
entrenchment perspective (Morck et al., 1988). When the proportion of owner’s shareholders 
is high, convergence of interest between the outside investors and owners arises since owners 
are less likely to act opportunistically because they face the consequences of their non-
company value- maximizing activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, it supports the 
argument that the level of conflict between inside owners and outside investor decreases as 
insider owner’s holdings increases. Thus, the need for voluntary disclosure is reduced. The 
underlying rationale is that, family owners are more actively engaged in company 
management by being the board members and the substantial shareholders of the company. 
Thus, they will have better access to the company’s financial and non-financial information 
and prefer less disclosure. However, when insiders (managers) have a large shareholding in 
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their companies, they may become entrenched and follow policies that are in their own best 
interests. Thus, management entrenchment could happen when managers holdings are high 
(Morck et al., 1988). Therefore, inside owners’ decisions will likely be prepared to benefit the 
personal interests of the owner, causing an information-asymmetry. Furthermore, 
confiscation of minority owners by the controlling owner could occur (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
Hence, outside investors will increase their monitoring of inside owner’s behaviour to 
mitigate the agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While, monitoring by outside 
owners increase costs, which can be reduced if inside owners disclose information 
voluntarily. Thus, when the owner-manager holding is significant, it is expected that 
information disclosure is likely to be greater so that outside shareholders can successfully 
monitor that their economic interests are optimized. However, based on the literature, it is 
unclear that whether family companies prefer more or less voluntary disclosure.  
     We employed random effect method to examine the relationship between gender diversity 
on the board of director and the level of FLID. The estimation results of the random- effects 
panel regression analysis are presented in Table 5 (panel A and B). As can be noted from 
Table 5 panel A and B, regression analysis reveals a significant positive relationship between 
the proportion of female on the board of directors and the level of FLID among the family 
group. This finding is consistent with Ali et al. (2007) and Tong (2007) who found that 
family companies disclose better information about company’s circumstance compared to 
non-family companies among S&P 500 firms. Furthermore, Chau and Gray (2010) examined 
the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and percentage of family 
ownership, among 273 listed companies in Hong Kong, and indicated a high proportion of 
family ownership is associated with higher voluntary disclosure. In addition, our results 
consistent with Wan-Hussin (2009) who found that family firms are more likely to disclose 
more information than non-family firms.  
However, Table 5 (panel A and B) shows that insignificant relationship between gender 
diversity on the board and the level of FLI disclosures among non-family companies. These 
findings are consistent with Nalikka (2009) who find no significant association between the 
proportion of CEO female and voluntary disclosure among 108 firms listed on the Helsinki 
stock exchange. On the contrary, the leverage ratio has a positive correlation with gender 
diversity on both panels. This finding is consistent with the notion that managers of non-
family companies may withhold bad news to maximize their compensation or to facilitate 
entrenchment (Ali et al. 2007).   
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Insert Table 5 about the association between percentages of female on the board of 
directors, female CEOs and the level of FLID among family and non-family company. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Globally, the companies are increasingly being encouraged to provide more FLID in their 
reporting practices which provide a firm ground for effective decision-making. The paper 
provides empirical evidence on the effect of board gender diversity on the level of FLID in 
Jordan. The Amman stock exchange is the biggest stock market in the region and follows 
IFRS guidelines in corporate reporting. The study findings show that the companies with 
higher proportion female directors are more likely to disclose FLI disclosures compared with 
others. The results further indicate that companies with female CEOs tend to make more 
FLID compared to those companies with male CEOs. In summary, the findings signpost that 
gender diversity on boards positively affects the level of FLID.  
     Since a large proportion of Jordanian companies are family-controlled companies, we 
further investigate whether the relationship between gender diversity on boards and the level 
of FLID differ among family firms compared to non-family companies. The results show that 
the proportion female directors have a positive and significant relationship with the level of 
FLID among family companies. The findings reveal a significant positive association 
between female CEOs and the level of FLID in non-family companies. The findings of the 
study should be of interest to policymakers, regulators and academics regarding the impact of 
gender diversity on boards and CEO’s characteristics on the level of FLID in developing 
countries. The findings provide empirical evidence that enables managers to assess their 
financial transparency and accountability, in turn helping firms to improve investors’ 
perceptions of the quality of financial reporting. From a practice point of view, the managers 
need to give priority to publishing voluntary disclosures in the intended spirit. Although, this 
study provides stimulating insights into the effects of gender diversity on boards on voluntary 
disclosures, much more evidence is needed from the boardroom discussions to bring to light 
the shades of group dynamics in the decisions on corporate disclosures.  
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Table 1. Original distribution of the sample about industry 
Description Number Percentage 
Educational services 26 12.93% 
Hotels and Tourism 38 18.90% 
Transportation 23 11.44% 
Commercial Services 41 20.39% 
Pharmaceutical and Medical industries 12 5.97% 
Chemical industries 15 7.46% 
Food and Beverages 17 8.45% 
Mining and Extraction industries 14 6.96% 
Engineering and Construction 6 2.98% 
Textiles, leather, and clothing 9 4.47% 
Total             201                          100% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable N Minimum  Maximum  Mean Median Std. Deviation 
FLI 1206 0  .78  .3114 .33 .1844 
POFOB 1206 0  .6  .0439 0 .0892 
NOFOB 1206 0  6  .2470 0 .4315 
CEOGEN 1206 0  1  .9519 1 .2140 
FSIZE 1206 412636  28802374  1801 1.87 1.57 
FPROF 1206 -.85904  .95  .0012 .01109 .1217   
FDIVID 1206 0  .9751  .1882 0 .3077 
FLEVER 1206 .0002    .9780  .2950 .2400 .2320 
FISIN 1206 1    201  .3631 101 .4811 
FLIDit= Forward-looking disclosure index of the I company in the t year, expressed as percentage 
total FLI disclosed out of all items. POFOB= the proportion of females on the board of directors 
measured by dividing the number of females on the board by total numbers of the board. NOFOB= 
the numbers of female on the board of directors. CEOGEN= CEO’s gender, take the value one if 
CEO, male and 0 if CEO female. FSIZE= Firm size, natural log of firm’s total assets. FPROF= 
profitability, measured by ROI (net income before tax divided be total assets). FDIVID= dividend 
ratio measured as cash dividends divided by net income for the same period. FLEVER= leverage 
ratio, measured by total long-term debt divided by total assets. FISIN= industry type, measured by 
using the isin code as stated by the Jordanian Securities Depository Centre.  
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Variables POFOB NOFOB CEGEN FSIZE FPROF FDIVID FLEVER FISIN 
POFOB 1.0000        
NOFOB 0.0744** 1.0000       
CEGEN 0.0008 0.0209 1.0000      
FSIZE 0.0279 -0.0226 0.0215 1.0000     
FPROF -0.0446 -0.0551 0.0024 0.0135 1.0000    
FDIVID -0.1204 -0.0207 0.0152 0.0688* 0.3714** 1.0000   
FLEVER -0.0213* 0.0399 0.0146 0.0326* -0.1563** 0.0347 1.0000  
FISIN -0.0771 -0.0702 -0.0102 0.0107 -0.0109 0.0021 0.0045 1.0000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
*.   Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
 
 
Table 4 Panel A: association between percentages of female on the board of directors, female CEOs 
and FLI disclosures. 
 Pred.sign. Coefficient. t-statistic Prob. 
Cons  .19239 6.30 0.000*** 
POFOB + .16660 2.27 0.023** 
CEOGEN + .06376 2.40 0.016** 
FSIZE + 1.5511 0.39 0.696 
FPROF + .10332 2.28 0.023** 
FDIVID +   .04690 2.62 0.009*** 
FLEVER + .19754 8.34 0.000*** 
FISIN + .00007 0.60 0.551 
Adjusted R2 
P. value 
Observations 
 55.6% 
0.000 
1206 
  
Panel B: association between the number of females on the board of directors, female CEOs and FLI 
disclosures. 
  Pred.sign. Coefficient.  t-statistic Prob. 
Cons   .19705  6.50 0.000*** 
NOFOB  + .02507  1.97 0.049** 
CEOGEN  + .06198  2.34   0.020** 
FSIZE  + 1.1511  0.29 0.773 
FPROF  + .09880  2.18 0.029** 
FDIVID  + .04682  2.62 0.009***   
FLEVER  + .19781  8.35 0.000*** 
FISIN  + .00005  0.47 0.642 
Adjusted R2   54.7%    
P. value   0.000    
Observations   1206    
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
*.   Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
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Table 5. Panel A: association between percentages of female on the board of directors, female CEOs 
and FLI disclosures among and non-family family company. 
Family company                        Non-family company 
 Pred.sign Coeff. t-statis. P[t] Coeff. t-statistic Prob. 
Cons  .2109 5.34 0.000*** .1737 3.58 0.000*** 
POFOB + .2654 2.91 0.004*** -.0568 -0.46 0.646 
CEOGEN + .0440 1.31 0.191 .1032 2.39 0.017** 
FSIZE - -2.541 -0.28 0.783 2.781 0.64 0.523 
FPROF - .0944 1.66 0.097* .1132 1.51 0.131 
FDIVID + .0536 2.28 0.023** .0418 1.52 0.130 
FLEVER + .1932 6.68 0.000***   .2116 5.05 0.000*** 
FISIN + .0001 0.55 0.580 -.0034 -0.64        0.524 
Adjusted R2  66.4%   76.4%   
P. value  0.001   0.000***   
N  768   438   
Panel B: association between the number of females on the board of directors, female CEOs and FLI 
disclosures among family and non-family companies. 
   Family Companies                Non-Family Companies 
   Pred.sign. Coeff t-statist. Prob. Coeff. t-statis. P[t] 
Cons  .2225 5.63 0.000*** .1608 3.33 0.001*** 
NOFOB + .0240 1.47 0.142 .0271 1.33 0.184 
CEOGEN + .0405  1.19 0.232 .1048 2.43 0.015** 
FSIZE - -2.821 -0.30 0.763   2.551 0.59 0.554 
FPROF + .0891 1.56 0.119 .1106 1.48 0.139 
FDIVID + .0521  2.21 0.027** .0414 1.50 0.132 
FLEVER + .1938 6.67 0.000*** .2043 4.90 0.000*** 
FISIN +   .0001 0.42 0.676 -.0002 -0.46 0.645 
Adjusted R2  48.4%   79%   
P. value  0.001   0.001   
N  768   438   
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
*.   Correlation is significant at the 0.10 
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Appendix 1 
FLI disclosures categories  
Financial FLI items 
Income. 
Profit. 
Loss. 
Cash flow. 
Capital. 
Return on equity. 
Sales. 
Capital expenditures. 
Production. 
Cost. 
Expenses. 
 
Non-financial FLI items 
Strategies items: 
Goals for performance. 
Mission. 
Objectives. 
 
Company structure 
Financial structure. 
Change in ownership. 
Industry type. 
Human and intellectual capital. 
Mergers and acquisitions. 
Technological structure. 
 
Environment 
Legal and regulatory. 
Political. 
Economic conditions. 
Social responsibility. 
Competitive position. 
Financial and non-financial resources. 
Risks. 
Relationship 
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